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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
No. 568-September Term, 1974; Decided May 29, 1975
Docket No. 74.2082
Fotochrome, Inc., Debtor-Appellant, v.
Copal Company, Ltd., Claimant-Appellee
CircuitJudge:
The parties to this appeal present some interesting questions concerning the
impact of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the Convention")' upon the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act. We find that there is no conflict between the Convention and
the Act on the facts of this case. We accordingly affirm the order of Judge
Weinstein, 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), which held that a Bankruptcy
Court does not have the power in a Chapter XI arrangement to relitigate the
merits of a contract dispute which has been resolved by binding arbitration in
a foreign forum, commenced before the filing of the Chapter XI petition and
concluded thereafter by an arbitral award in the foreign country.
Fotochrome, Inc. ("Fotochrome"), a Delaware corporation with offices in the
Eastern District of New York, and Copal Company, Ltd. ("Copal"), a Japanese
corporation, neither present nor doing business in the United States, entered
into a contract in 1966 under which Copal would manufacture cameras in
Japan according to specifications provided by Fotochrome, and Fotochrome
would purchase the cameras for distribution in the United States. A dispute
arose in which each party charged the other with failure to abide by the terms
of the contract. Copal claimed damages of $631,501 for Fotochrome's breach
of conditions in the contract and its failure to pay for delivered cameras;
Fotochrome claimed damages of $828,582 for Copal's failure to meet the
delivery schedule and for its manufacture of defective cameras.
The parties had agreed in their contract that final settlement of any disputes
arising out of the contract would be reached by arbitration in Tokyo, Japan. In
1967, Copal filed a petition for arbitration with the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association ("JCAA"); Fotochrome filed a formal answer on July
GURFEIN,

121 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (Dec. 29, 1970); implemented by 9 U.S.C. § 201
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31, 1967. The first of seventeen arbitral sessions was held by the JCAA on
December 21, 1967. Fotochrome participated with Japanese counsel in all
sessions except the last. Copal presented its evidence in sixteen sessions over the
course of twenty-five months.
At the fourteenth session on October 1, 1969, Fotochrome's counsel asked to
be allowed to examine two witnesses on his client's behalf. The tribunal
scheduled examinations on October 31 and November 5, but the witnesses were
not produced. Sessions were rescheduled for December 4 and, later, for January
27, but on each occasion, Fotochrome failed to produce its witnesses. On
January 27, 1970 the arbitrators informed Fotochrome's counsel that if the
witnesses did not appear at the next session, the arbitration might be
terminated. The session was scheduled for March 31.
On March 26, 1970 Fotochrome filed a petition for an arrangement under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., in the Eastern
District of New York. Referee Sherman Warner issued an order on March 27
continuing Fotochrome as debtor in possession and enjoining "all creditors of
the debtor.., from commencing or continuing any actions, suits, arbitrations,
or the enforcement of any claim in any Court against this debtor. .. "
(Emphasis supplied.) The restraining order, in terms, applied only to creditors,
not to the debtor in possession. In any event, Fotochrome did not seek the
court's permission to continue to participate in the JCAA arbitration, although
it knew it was scheduled to present its case in Tokyo four days later.
On March 31, at the JCAA arbitral session, counsel for Fotochrome notified
the tribunal that the petition had been filed in the United States District Court
and that the stay had issued. He did not present the two witnesses as scheduled.
On April 8, Fotochrome's counsel informed the JCAA that he had been
discharged by his client. On April 9, the JCAA panel convened to consider the
effect of Fotochrome's withdrawal and the stay order of the United States
District Court. Copal urged the tribunal to proceed. On July 2, the tribunal
decided that the bankruptcy court's stay was not effective with respect to it, and
ordered the sessions terminated.
On September 18, the arbitral panel issued an award in favor of Copal in the
amount of $624,457.80, plus interest from January 1, 1967. The tribunal
resolved both Copal's claim and Fotochrome's counterclaim, which it dismissed,
considering evidence supplied by both parties; it was unable, of course, to
consider evidence that might have been supplied by the two witnesses
Fotochrome had intended to present.
On October 21, Copal filed the arbitral award with the Tokyo District Court.
As of that time, under Article 800 of the Japan Code of Civil Procedure, the
award became in effect a final and conclusive judgment settling the rights and
obligations of the parties in Japan.
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On October 22, Copal filed a proof of claim in Fotochrome's bankruptcy
proceedings in the amount of the arbitral award. Apparently in the belief that
the Referee's stay would operate to bar proceedings to enforce the Japanese
award in this country, Copal did not seek confirmation of the Japanese
judgment either in the New York courts under the Act for the Recognition of
Foreign Money Judgments, C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09, or in a federal court under the
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9, or the Convention, 9 U.S.C. § 207.
Fotochrome, as debtor in possession, challenged the claim presented to the
Bankruptcy Court, and requested a hearing on the merits of Copal's underlying
claim. Referee Parente, after a preliminary hearing, held that the Japanese
award could not be treated as a final judgment in the bankruptcy proceeding
and that the bankruptcy court would reconsider the merits of the underlying
dispute. The Referee reasoned that under Section 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § I la(15), the restraining order of March 27 "effectively imposed [the
Bankruptcy Court's] paramount authority over the estate of the debtor in
possession ousting the jurisdiction of the Japan CAA." He ruled that the
Japanese arbitral award, obtained after the filing of the petition for an
arrangement, without authority of the Bankruptcy Court, was not binding on
the debtor in possession and could be reopened for consideration on the merits
in the Chapter XI proceeding.
Judge Weinstein reversed the Referee's order, holding that the restraining
order of the Bankruptcy Court had no extraterritorial effect as such, Japan not
being within the territorial limits subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court, Section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a), and because Copal
did not have the requisite minimum contacts with the United States to render it
subject to the in personamjurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court; that the award
was a final judgment under Japanese law; and that the provisions of the
bilateral treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and Japan (the "Japanese Treaty") 2 and the Convention entitled Copal to
seek confirmation of its award as a judgment in the United States.'
The New York and federal statutes and the Convention provide for two
stages: recognition of the award and its enforcement. C.P.L.R. § 5303; 9
U.S.C. §§ 9, 13; Convention, Art. III. The award itself is inchoate until
enforced by judgment. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11,
the enforcement of an arbitration award is subject to certain limited defenses.
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. 2863 (April 2, 1953).
As Judge Weinstein noted, though the United States acceded to the Convention after the
contract in suit was signed and shortly after the award was made, the Convention contains no
prospective language and should be applied retroactively to existing arbitration agreements and
awards. 377 F. Supp. at 30, citing Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitration Awards, 58 A.B.AJ.
821, 822 (1972).
24
3
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That is true, as well, under the New York C.P.L.R. §§ 5304, 5305, and the
Convention, Art. V. The United Nations Convention further provides that
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to the public
policy of the country. Art. V, 2(b).
We note at the outset that there is no reference to bankruptcy in the
Convention. Nor is there any reference to whether the "public policy" of the
forum state to require equal treatment of creditors in the case of bankruptcy is
the kind of "public policy" that allows non-recognition of foreign arbitral
awards. "The legislative history of the provision offers no certain guidelines to
its construction." See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Ge'neral de L 'IndustrieDu Papier(Rakta), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2 Cir. 1974).
The public policy in favor of international arbitration is strong. Scherk v.
Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). And
we have recently indicated that the "public policy" limitation on the Convention
is to be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate
the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice. Parsons &
Whittemore, supra, 508 F.2d at 974.
As we shall see, this appeal can be decided without the necessity of
determining whether the Bankruptcy Act involves a "public policy" which is
contrary to enforcement of arbitral awards under the Convention.
The questions that arise on this appeal are: (1) Is a foreign arbitral award
rendered after the filing of a Chapter XI petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court nevertheless a valid determination on the merits? (2) If it is,
what is the domestic "competent authority" to consider the limited defenses
against its enforcement, the District Court or the Bankruptcy Court?
We note at the outset that Judge Weinstein's holding with regard to the
Bankruptcy Court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Copal is clearly correct
and we affirm it without further elaboration. The Bankruptcy Court did not
enjoy personal jurisdiction over Copal until October 22, 1970 when Copal's
claim was filed, for Copal did not have the "minimum contacts" with the United
States required under Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). Therefore,
its stay did not operate against Copal. See Restatement 2d, Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 7 (1965). Nor did the stay operate against
Fotochrome, for it was directed only to creditors. Fotochrome was free, certainly
with the permission of the Bankruptcy Court, which it never sought, to complete
the arbitration in Japan. The sole effect of the stay for the purposes of this case
was to induce Copal to file a claim in bankruptcy based directly on the arbitral
award rather than to seek prior confirmation in an American court of general

International Lawyer, Vol. 9. No. 4

JudicialDecisions

805

jurisdiction. We hold that it should not have proceeded in that manner.
There appears to be no specific statutory authority for a Bankruptcy Judge to
stay a domestic arbitration proceeding, although we assume, arguendo, that he
may do so. See 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(1S), 714; but see 1A COLLIER, ON
11.08 at 1149-50 (14th ed. 1974). But such stay cannot be
BANKRUPTCY
effective, in any event, without in personam jurisdiction over the creditor who
has begun an action in a foreign tribunal that is not within the jurisdiction of the
United States. Nor can it be argued that the stay must have affected the
arbitration because of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over the debtor's
assets. Even within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court over matters affecting those assets is not
necessarily exclusive. See Thompson v. MagnoliaCo., 309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940);
3 COLLIER, supra, 57.15 [3.2] at 260.
Neither the Convention nor the arbitration statutes indicates what should be
done in the event of the bankruptcy of one of the parties to an arbitration. Nor
does the Bankruptcy Act reveal how a Bankruptcy Judge should handle an
arbitration award filed as proof of claim under Section 63a(5) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(5). That section requires the Bankruptcy Court to accept
as a final adjudication of a claim "provable debts reduced to judgment after the
filing of the petition and before the consideration of the bankrupt's application
for a discharge ... ." But an arbitral award cannot be considered a "judgment"
within the terms of the statute, for the process of procuring a judgment based on
an arbitral award involves the due process right to contest the award on the
limited statutory grounds permitted. Without such an opportunity to contest
confirmation, it is hard to see how the award itself can be sufficient for a proof
of claim in bankruptcy. Until its merger in a judgment, we do not think it is a
provable debt under Section 63(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.
It is nevertheless a binding adjudication on the merits. We conclude that a
foreign arbitral award rendered after the filing of a Chapter XI petition in a
United States Bankruptcy Court in an arbitration proceeding commenced prior
to such filing is a valid determination on the merits and is unreviewable by the
Bankruptcy Court.
A proceeding looking to an ultimate distribution of assets, or, we presume, an
arrangement of the debtor under Chapter XI as well, has a twofold aspect, as
Justice Brandeis noted in Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1929)-a)
distribution of the property and b) determination of the amount of indebtedness
to particular creditors. The latter function "is strictly a proceeding in
personam."-Ibid. In Riehle, an in personam suit against the debtor, which had
been commenced before the receivership, was allowed to continue to judgment
in the state court without the participation of the receiver, the default judgment
being accepted as an adjudication of the existence of the indebtedness. The
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Supreme Court noted further:
The establishment of a claim constituting the basis of the right to participate in the
distribution of property in the possession of one court is often conclusively determined
by a judgment obtained in another court. 279 U.S. at 225.
The analogy carries us to the point that a judgment obtained after a petition
is filed and before discharge may in some circumstances be proved as a claim
against the estate under Section 63(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act even though the
receiver or trustee (or debtor in possession) did not participate in the suit
resulting in the judgment. The analogy was carried forward to a Chapter X
reorganization by this court in Doyle v. Nemerov's Executors, 223 F.2d 54 (2 Cir.
1955), where Judge Learned Hand observed "although the section [§ 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29] gave the bankruptcy court power before
adjudication to enjoin suits, the petition did not stay them automatically." 223
F.2d at 56. In the case of this Chapter XI proceeding, the result is afortiori,for
the debtor in possession had actually participated in the Japanese arbitration,
which began before the petition was filed.
The conclusion that we must enforce the award as a valid determination on
the merits is mandated by the United Nations Convention, which provides in
Article III:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on
the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519,
T.I.A.S. 6997 at 3, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40 (1970).
Under this Article, equal treatment of foreign awards is the minimum required
of a Contracting State. Foreign awards are vulnerable to attack only on the
grounds expressed in other articles of the Convention, particularly Article V.
See 9 U.S.C. § 207; Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
4
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1065-66 (1961).
Under the Convention it seems quite clear that enforcement may be refused at
the instance of the losing party only on proof of specified conditions, one of
which is that "[tihe party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case." (Emphasis added.)
Art. V, l(b).

*The Japanese Treaty, a general treaty, is not quite as specific in its arbitration clause as the
Convention. Article IV, 2 provides:
Awards duly rendered pursuant to any ... contracts [providing for arbitration of disputes],
which are final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed
conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before the courts of competent jurisdiction of
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These provisions of the Convention are made effective by the statute which
implements the Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 207 provides in part: "The court shall
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of
recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention."
At this point we must, however, recognize another difficulty. We have recently
held that if the arbitral award actually results in a judgment in the foreign
country, it may be enforced as a foreign money judgment in the State of New
York, regardless of the limiting provisions of the Convention and subject only to
the non-enforcement provisions of Article 53 of the New York C.P.L.R. Island
Territory of Curacaov. Solitron Devices, Inc., supra.
This raises the question whether the Japanese arbitration award has, ipso
facto, the status of a judgment, in which event arguments against enforcement
would be limited to those provided in Article 53 of the C.P.L.R. if enforcement is
sought in the state courts of New York. If it is not equivalent to a judgment,
enforcement is governed by the provisions of the Convention.
It is true that, in literal terms, as Judge Weinstein noted, Article 800 of the
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure provides: "An [arbitral] award shall have the
same effect as a judgment which is final and conclusive between the parties."
The Judge stated that the Japanese award may be recognized pursuant to New
York's statute on recognition of foreign country money judgments, C.P.L.R.
§§ 5301-09 (1970), citing the Solitron case, but also noted the provision for
removal from state to federal court in actions relating to the Convention. 9
U.S.C. § 205. He carefully refrained from a definitive choice between state and
federal courts, declaring that "Copal is now free to seek recognition of its award
as an American judgment. Fotochrome may prove grounds for non-recognition." We think that Judge Weinstein was right in concluding that the Japanese
arbitral award may not itself be treated as a foreign money judgment.
Under the Convention, enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused at
the instance of the losing party on proof of specified conditions. Art. VI, 1(b).
There is, in addition, a requirement in Article III of the Convention, as we have
seen, that each contracting state shall enforce arbitral awards in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon. Since

either Party, and shall be entitled to be declared enforceable by such courts, except where found
contrary to public policy. 4 U.S.T. 2063 at 2068, T.I.A.S. 2863 at 7.
To the extent that there may be a conflict between the Treaty and the Convention, we think that
where both parties to a bilateral treaty, Japan and the United States, later become signatories to a
multinational convention covering the same subject matter, the Convention is intended to control.
We reach this conclusion despite the saving clause preserving the validity of bilateral agreements
between the contracting states. Convention, Article VII. The adhesion of additional signatories
does not affect the circumstance that each signatory, bound by bilateral agreement, is modifying
its earlier engagement vis-a-vis the other, but only to the extent necessary. Furthermore, inasmuch
as both agreements further the same purpose, the one tending to further that purpose most
forcefully, the Convention, should be given effect.
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under our procedure the losing party may object to confirmation on limited
grounds that are specified in the Convention, we cannot treat the Japanese
arbitral award as equivalent to a final judgment barring such recourse by the

losing party when enforcement is sought. We need not rely on theories of
territorial jurisdiction to conclude that a foreign award can never be

self-executing in the forum state but must be merged in a local judgment to be
effective as a matter of domestic law. See Lorenzen, CommercialArbitrationEnforcement of ForeignAwards, 45 YALE L.J. 39, 56 (1935). The Convention
itself makes a distinction between recognition and enforcement of an arbitral

award. And when grounds are specified for non-enforcement, such a provision
necessarily implies a remedy for its assertion.
The award, on this analysis, is therefore not a judgment under Section 63(a)(5)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103a(5), and its filing as a proof of claim was
premature. Copal must seek a judgment based on the award in a District Court
of the United States under 9 U.S.C. § 207.1 Fotochrome must, in turn, be given
the right to assert the non-enforceability of the award under conditions specified
in Article V of the Convention. The determination of the enforcement of the
award is a matter not before us on this appeal.
The restraining order of the Bankruptcy Court must be vacated with respect
to Copal to allow it to secure a judgment. Both the Supreme Court in Scherk v.
Alberto Culver Co., supra, and this court in Solitron Devices, supra, have

stressed the need for encouraging international arbitration and for putting no
roadblocks in its way.

It may, indeed, seem anomalous that a domestic contracting party might have
been restrained from pursuing the arbitration remedy upon the filing of the
petition herein, while a Japanese contracting party, similarly situated, may

proceed to an arbitration award.
The result is not quite as anomalous as appears, however. For in a converse
situation an American company might procure an arbitral award in the United

'The question whether foreign arbitral awards will be enforceable in the United States courts
has become a subject of only historical interest so far as nationals of countries signatory to the
Convention are concerned, for 9 U.S.C. § 207 gives federal jurisdiction for the enforcement of such
awards, implementing the Convention.
Before the Convention, although an arbitral award rendered in another state of the Union was
entitled to full faith and credit, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), that obviously did not, in
terms, apply to awards made in foreign countries. See generally, Von Mehren and Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudications, 81 HAnv. L. REV. 1601, 1606 (1968); RESTATEMENT 2d,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment b (1971). No state had a statute providing for the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, see Domke, Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwardsin the United States,
13 An. J. (N.S.) 91, 92 (1958), and, curiously, the Federal Arbitration Act, though it embraces
foreign commerce, makes no provision for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the
Act unless the parties, by agreement, have specified a court in which an order confirming the
award may be made. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. That is now largely covered by Sections 203 and 207 of
Title 9.
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States against a Japanese firm in financial trouble whose Japanese creditors
might be under a stay from a Japanese court.
We are not concerned here with a case where the Japanese firm seeking
arbitration in Japan is also doing business here and is subject to an in personam
restraint by a United States Bankruptcy Court from proceeding against its
contracting party whose assets are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court. That situation we leave for another day.
The order of the District Court reversing the order of the Bankruptcy Judge is
affirmed. Appellee may seek confirmation of its arbitral award by judgment in
the United States District Court under 9 U.S.C. § 207, and, if successful, may
thereafter file a proof of claim in the Chapter XI proceeding based upon the
judgment so obtained.
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